In Wences v. City of Los Angeles[1], the California Court of Appeal addressed what they considered an issue of first impression: Whether a reviewing court should apply the substantial evidence test or the independent judgment test in an administrative mandamus proceeding where the challenged discipline is solely a reprimand, as opposed to a more severe penalty. The Court of Appeal held that independent review of the evidence was appropriate under the facts of this case.
The case arose from an incident involving an off-duty LAPD police officer, Cesar Wences. After receiving several threatening phone calls from Edie Rodriguez, Wences was confronted outside his home by Rodriguez and three other individuals. Wences approached the four individuals with his firearm in a low-ready position. After Rodriguez assaulted Wences’ wife, Wences fired a warning shot at the ground in front of Rodriguez. As a result of the incident, Wences received an official reprimand from the LAPD for using unauthorized tactics and inappropriately drawing his weapon. Wences filed suit to set aside the reprimand pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) Section 1094.5.
CCP Section 1094.5 governs judicial review of any final decision or order rendered by an administrative agency. There are two possible standards of judicial review, depending upon the nature of the right involved.[2] First, if the administrative decision affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.[3] However, if the decision involves neither a vested fundamental right nor substantially affects such a right, the trial court’s review is limited to determining whether the administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence.[4] Whether an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right must be determined on a case-by-case basis.[5] A right may be deemed fundamental on either or both of two bases: (1) the character and quality of its economic aspect; or (2) the character and quality of its human aspect.[6] The ultimate question in each case is whether the effected right is deemed to be of sufficient significance to preclude its extinction or abridgement by a body lacking judicial power.[7]
In Wences, the trial court held an independent standard of review did not apply to Officer Wences, because the official reprimand did not involve a fundamental right. Specifically, the disciplinary action did not deprive Wences of any property or employment right, nor did it have a financial impact. However, the Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that determination of whether a right is fundamental requires focusing on the nature of the right itself, rather than on the actual amount of harm.[8] Analyzing Wences’ claim, the court determined the right at issue was Wences’ right to employment as a non-probationary peace officer. While the reprimand did not actually deprive Wences of his employment, the court recognized the reprimand might be considered by the Department in future personnel decisions, thus affecting his future opportunities for career advancement. As such, the reprimand sufficiently affected a fundamental right and was entitled to independent review.
The Wences case is not a change in settled law, but rather a clarification on what constitutes a “fundamental right” for purposes of determining the appropriate standard of review for administrative decisions. The case stands for the proposition that any administrative reprimand that might, speculatively, have an adverse impact on future earning potential and career advancement, is sufficiently connected with a fundamental right, triggering independent judicial review.
Should you be interested in learning more about the Wences case, or how this case impacts administrative decisions in general, please contact AGC Partner Scott E. Nichols by phone at (562) 699-5500 or by email at snichols@agclawfirm.com.
[1] Cal. Court of Appeal, 2d App. Dist., Case No. B208525 (filed Sept. 2, 2009).
[2] C.C.P. § 1094.5(c) (2009).
[3] Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32.
[4] Id.
[5] Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144.
[6] Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Board (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 770, 780.
[7] Id. at 779.
[8] Dickey v. Retirement Board (1976) 16 Cal.3d 745, 751.
