On Monday, the California Supreme Court broadened the permissible use of information gleaned from a police officer’s personnel file by defense attorneys after Pitchess motion proceedings.[1] In Chambers v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Diego County,[2] the court ruled unanimously that “derivative information” garnered from a witness discovered through a Pitchess motion can be used in subsequent investigations and cases where the same witness is identified after subsequent Pitchess proceedings.
In Chambers, the defendant was charged with obstructing a police officer, and claimed in defense that the officer overreacted and used excessive force in arresting him. Upon Chambers filing a Pitchess motion, the trial court found “good cause” to inspect the officer’s personnel file, but found no relevant information to disclose. Later, Chambers filed a supplemental Pitchess motion after his public defender discovered Pitchess information about the same arresting officer in the course of defending another defendant in an unrelated case (People v. Washington). The trial court denied Chambers’ supplemental motion to release the name of the complainants disclosed in the Washington case and ultimately the derivative information related to the complainants.
In the decision by Justice Corrigan, the California Supreme Court overturned the trial court, and granted such use, adopting the following rule: If counsel for Defendant A files a Pitchess motion, receives the name of the complainant, then investigates and develops derivative information, and if that same counsel representing Defendant B later files a Pitchess motion, resulting in disclosure of the same complainant as in Defendant A’s case, counsel may then use the derivative information previously acquired. As the court reasoned, “[T]here is no danger of an unjustified disclosure, as [Defendant B] will receive the name of the officer through his own Pitchess motion.” The court stressed that Defendant B must bring his own Pitchess motion, and the trial court must still find “good cause” and “relevance” in both cases to warrant release independently. Thus, derivative information developed by independent investigation after Pitchess disclosure is not subject to a protective order when a subsequent defendant files his own Pitchess motion and receives the name of the same complainant to which the derivative information pertains. The decision essentially answers the question: “May an attorney use witness interview information in a second case?” According to Justice Corrigan, the answer is a qualified “Yes, if that same witness is identified to be relevant by the second Pitchess motion.”
Importantly, the court’s holding did not overrule the protective order protocol required under Evidence Code Section 1045(e). In concurring opinions written separately by Justices Moreno and Baxter, the issue of using the derivative information as the basis for the subsequent Pitchess motion was discussed. However the more expansive approach advocated by Justice Moreno was not adopted by the high court. It is clear that the subsequent Pitchess motion must be won independently to reveal a common witness for which derivative information was obtained. Accordingly, the court did not disturb the protective order’s protections.
Since the Pitchess process is regularly utilized by criminal defendants, counsel for police officers and police departments must be aware of this new rule. Although based on a narrow set of facts, the Chambers decision expands the use of information acquired in one case for use in another. A potential scenario where this could occur is if a new complaint is generated between the arrest of the first and second defendants in similar but separate cases prior to the first defendant’s trial, and the new complaint is discovered by defense counsel after a Pitchess proceeding in both cases. The Chambers decision underscores the importance of vigorously defending each Pitchess motion to limit the misuse and improper disclosure of confidential information from police officers’ personnel files.
For more information regarding Pitchess motions, contact Andrew Jared at 562.699.5500.
[1] See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 351 (1974). The Pitchess process seeks to protect police officers’ privacy by requiring a judge to review police personnel files before anything contained in them can be used in court.
[2] Chambers v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. S143491, Cal. Supreme Court (Nov. 26, 2007).
