Last week, the California Court of Appeal issued an opinion upholding California’s sex offender registration system, ruling that the requirement to register as a sex offender does not constitute criminal punishment, but is rather a public safety measure intended to protect families and children. The case, People v. Presley, indicates that criminals can be required to register as sex offenders even if such requirements were not considered or ordered by a jury.[1] The case extends a growing line of California legal authorities recognizing the importance of government’s ability to require sex offenders to register with local authorities and to publish sex offenders’ information on the Internet.
The Defendant in People v. Presley was convicted of felony false imprisonment and misdemeanor assault in connection with a drunken (and unsuccessful) attempt to sexually assault a long-time friend. Because the crime was motivated by sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification, the trial court’s sentence included a requirement that the Defendant register as a sex offender pursuant to California Penal Code Section 290(a)(2)(E).[2] On appeal, the Defendant challenged the requirement to register as a sex offender on the ground that this condition was a “penalty enhancement” which violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and on the ground that California’s sex offender residency restrictions (commonly known as “Jessica’s Law”) were unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeal rejected each of these challenges, and upheld the sentence requiring the Defendant to register as a sex offender. In addressing the Defendant’s challenge under the Sixth Amendment, the court rebuffed the Defendant’s claim that the registration requirement was a “sentence enhancement” which had not been proved to the jury. While the Sixth Amendment requires crimes to be proven “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court held that the registration requirement was not a criminal penalty, but was rather a public safety measure intended to protect the public, not penalize the Defendant. The court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe, which held that Alaska’s sex offender registration requirements — which are stricter than California’s — did not constitute criminal punishment.[3] Thus, the registration requirement was not a criminal penalty, and the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were therefore not violated.
As for the Defendant’s claim that the residency restrictions under Jessica’s Law were unconstitutional, the court noted that the Defendant failed to properly raise this argument, and therefore waived his challenge. Jessica’s Law was passed by California’s voters in 2006, and prevents sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or park where children frequently gather.[4] No California court has decisively ruled on Jessica’s Law’s restrictions on sex offender residency, and it is clear that the court in People v. Presley was not prepared to address the merits of this issue. Thus, this section of the court’s opinion was not certified for publication, and is not binding precedent for future cases.
As such, People v. Presley makes it clear that California’s sex offender registration requirements are valid public safety measures which may be legally imposed on offenders regardless of other forms of punishment. The case reserves for future consideration the legality of Jessica’s Law and its restrictions on sex offender residency.
For information regarding Jessica’s Law and the legal options available to local agencies for the regulation of sex offenders, contact Matthew Gorman at 562.699.5500.
[1] People v. Bruce Michelle Presley, No. C054589 (Super. Ct. No. 06F02210) California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District (Sacramento) (Nov. 8, 2007).
[2] Cal. Penal Code § 290(a)(2)(E), now Penal Code § 290.005, states in relevant part: “The following persons shall register in accordance with the Act: (b) Any person ordered by any other court, to register as a sex offender for any offense, if the court found at the time of conviction or sentencing that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification.”
[3] Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
[4] Penal Code § 3003.5(b).
